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ABSTRACT
The search for Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) launchers is
modeled mathematically using the Random Search Model . Special
provisions are made in the model to account for the fact that the
launcher is not always exposed to detection by the searcher. The
probability that the launcher is exposed to detection is assumed
to be both deterministic and stochastic. The tactical
implications of the results of the model are discussed and
several methods are provided to improve search performance based









B. MOBILE TBM LAUNCHER CIRCULATION MODEL 2
C. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PERSIAN GULF WAR ... 4
D. STATEMENT OF THESIS 6
E. THESIS OUTLINE 6
II. PROBLEM SCOPE . 7
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 7
B. THE TARGET 8
C. SEARCHER CHARACTERISTICS 10
D. SIMILARITIES TO ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE .... 11
E. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TBM LAUNCHERS AND
SUBMARINES 13
III. METHODOLOGY 16
A. BASIC APPROACH 16
B. RANDOM SEARCH MODEL 17
C. MODIFIED RANDOM SEARCH FORMULATION 2





IV. ANALYSIS OF MODIFIED RANDOM SEARCH MODEL .... 24
A. DETERMINISTIC EXPOSURE 24
B. UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED EXPOSURE 27
C. TRIANGULARLY DISTRIBUTED TARGET EXPOSURES ... 28
1. Triangular Distribution with Mean of One-
half 28
2. Triangular Distribution with Mean of One-
Third 31
D. SUMMARY 3 3
V. TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SEARCH MODEL 3 6
A. FACTORS AFFECTING THE COVERAGE RATIO 3 7
1. Sweep Width 37
2. Total Search Length 38
3. Search Area 3 9
B. FACTORS AFFECTING TARGET EXPOSURE TO DETECTION 4
1. Use of Passive Sensors 40
2. Use of Active Sensors 41
3 . Use of Area Denial Weapons 42
4. Destruction of Roads and Bridges 42
C. MULTIPLE SEARCHERS 43
D. FACTORS OUTSIDE OF THE SEARCH MODEL 4 3
1. Historical Analysis of Operations 44
2. Cuing the Search Effort 44
3. Training and Practice 45
4. Destroy or Trail 46
v
E. SUMMARY 47
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 4 8
A. SUMMARY 4 8
B. CONCLUSIONS 49
C. POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 51
APPENDIX A. DEVELOPMENT OF RANDOM SEARCH MODEL ... 53
A. RANDOM SEARCH MODEL 53
APPENDIX B. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION BY CONDITIONING 56
A. $ DISTRIBUTED UNIFORMLY BETWEEN ZERO AND ONE . 56
B. $ DISTRIBUTED TRIANGULARLY WITH MEAN ONE-HALF . 57
C. $ DISTRIBUTED TRIANGULARLY WITH MEAN ONE -THIRD 5 8
LIST OF REFERENCES 6
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 61
VI
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The proliferation of Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM's)
poses a great threat to the national interests of the United
States. It has been shown that even a modest improvement in
attack operations against the ballistic missile launchers and
support equipment can yield large dividends in terms of fewer
missiles launched. To plan and analyze attack operations
against TBM launchers, it is helpful to have mathematical
models that describe the various phases of the operation.
This thesis presents a mathematical model that is based on the
theory of random search and describes the search for TBM
launchers and support equipment in terms of the probability of
detection and the required search effort. The model includes
a specific term that accounts for the fact that the TBM
launchers are not always in the open able to be detected by
the searcher. This term, the probability of target exposure
to detection, was considered to be both deterministic and
random during the model analysis.
The probability of detecting a TBM launcher during a
search depends on the probability that the target is exposed
to detection and the coverage ratio, a measure of search
effort. The figure below shows this relationship for a few
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Deterministic Exposure Proportions.
percent probability of detecting a continuously exposed
launcher requires a coverage ratio of about 2.5. This means
the search area has to be covered two and a half times during
the search. To achieve the same probability of detection
against a launcher that is only exposed 20 percent of the time
a coverage ratio of over 11 is required, almost a five fold
increase in required search effort. If the searcher knew when
the launcher was exposed to detection, he could reduce the
search effort by five times by only searching during those
periods
.
Actions by the searcher that either increase the
launcher's exposure probability or decrease the time searched
vm
when the launcher is hidden, raise the probability of
detecting the launcher or reduce the required search effort.
Such actions could include:
• developing better sensors, preferably passive, which allow
for the detection of TBM launchers at greater ranges
• increasing the time on station capabilities of search
assets
• reducing the area to be searched by using computer aided
search models to identify likely operating areas
• using area denial weapons like mines to increase the
amount of time the launchers are exposed to detection
• destroying roads and overpasses in TBM launcher operating
areas to increase the exposure time
• developing and using remote ground based sensors or human
observers to better refine when and where to search
• increasing the number of searchers, which increases the
level of effort
• using analysis of historical operations to refine when and
where to search
• marking or trailing launchers once they are found if the
expected benefit of finding a staging area is greater than
the benefit of killing that launcher
• developing search tactics that make the search effort less
random and more systematic
These suggestions can greatly improve the performance of







Defense against Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) attack is
of great interest to the Department of Defense and the
National Command Authority. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin as
the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services
addressed Tactical Missile Defenses (TMD) in the following
way:
The global proliferation of ballistic missile technology
and weapons of mass destruction has become one of the most
immediate and dangerous threats to U.S. national security
in the post Cold War era. Over time, this threat will
most likely evolve from today's shorter-range, inaccurate
missiles in the direction of more sophisticated, longer-
range and increasingly accurate systems. Therefore, the
question of how the U.S. can modernize its TMD
capabilities to best ensure that its forward deployed and
power projection forces possess effective defenses against
future tactical ballistic missile threats is
paramount. [Ref . 1]
Tactical ballistic missile (TBM) defense can take many forms.
The most visible form of defense is the active defense using
systems like the PATRIOT and AEGIS to shoot down the ballistic
missiles once in flight. Another type of defense is called
attack operations or counter-force and it includes attacking
the ballistic missile launchers, support equipment, storage
sites and infrastructure. Finally, passive defenses like
counter-targeting and civil defense can be used to mitigate
the danger of an attack. The United States needs to examine
the various ways in which to defend its forces against
Tactical Ballistic Missile attack.
Effectively countering the Tactical Ballistic Missile
threat will require community identification with all aspects
of the mission and detailed analytical thought. The campaign
to counter the TBM threat should be very similar to the allied
campaign against the U-boats of World War II. The campaign
against the U-boats was characterized by dedicated
organizations that were responsible for all aspects of the
campaign. This included procurement of assets, the training
of operators, and detailed analysis of operations to improve
performance. The formal study of Operations Research
developed from these analytical efforts and the science of
Search Theory was started by the Ant i- Submarine Warfare
Operations Research Group (ASWORG) of the United States Navy.
This close tie between a dedicated warfare community and
Operations Analysis has been the defining characteristic of
Ant i- Submarine Warfare in the U.S. Navy. A similar union is
needed to counter the TBM threat
.
B. MOBILE TBM LAUNCHER CIRCULATION MODEL
Lt
. Ehlers developed a circulation model to analyze the
operations of mobile TBM launchers [Ref . 2] . The model was
based on a 1969 Center of Naval Analyses study of a steady
state ant i- shipping campaign conducted by independently









Figure 1. Mobile TBM Launcher Circulation Model
developed by Lt . Ehlers. He used the circulation model to
show the benefit of a counter-force effort. In this
circulation model q 1 is the outward transit survival
probability and q2 is the return transit survival probability.
q 3 is the probability that a missile is not destroyed in
flight, the missile survival probability. Using this model it
was shown that the expected number of enemy missiles T that
"successfully penetrate the air defense network and reach






The analysis of the model showed that if q2 = 0.9 and the
outward transit survival probability q1 is reduced just 10
percent (from 1.0 to 0.9) then the expected number of missiles
reaching the target area will be reduced by more than 50
percent for all values of q3 . This highlights the benefit of
hitting the TBM launchers vice just the missiles in flight.
Hitting the launchers becomes even more important if the
ballistic missiles are armed with multiple chemical or
biological warheads. With multiple warheads the active
defenses could become saturated or the warheads may be too
small to hit. Additionally, intercepting a ballistic missile
armed with a chemical or biological warhead may just release
the contents a few hundredths of a second early and would not
protect the target area. The proliferation of ballistic
missiles and warheads of mass destruction requires that the
missiles and launchers be attacked on the ground before launch
to ensure the safety of friendly forces and civilians.
C. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
During the Persian Gulf War the air campaign planners
"intended to reduce the offensive [TBM] threat by attacking
the fixed [TBM launch] sites, support bases, and production
facilities, potential hide sites and support facilities for
mobile launchers, but not the launchers themselves ." [Ref . 3:p.
19] The mobile launchers were not attacked because no one had
"devised, prior to the war, a search-and-destroy scheme for
dealing with the mobile launchers ." [Ref . 3:p. 19] Even with
the attacks on known targets Iraq was still able to average
14.7 launches per week during the war. Additionally, no
mobile launchers were ever confirmed as destroyed by fixed
wing aircraft [Ref. 3:p. 26] . The aircraft probably attacked
decoys or vehicles such as tanker trucks that look like TBM
launchers. The amount of effort applied to the destruction of
mobile TBM launchers was significant but it was only a small
part of the overall air campaign. There were roughly 1000
"Scud patrol" sorties that dropped ordnance on other targets
and only about 215 attacks on mobile launchers themselves out
of 1,500 (about 15 percent) total strikes associated with
ballistic missile capabilities [Ref. 3:p. 27] . These air
strikes represent less than 6 percent of the 41,310 total
fixed-wing air strikes conducted during the war.
The effort to destroy mobile TBM launchers during the
Persian Gulf War was largely ineffective. The United States
needs to do better if it hopes to counter TBM attacks in
future conflicts. The Navy started the study of Operations
Research in World War II by opening the ASWORG group to find
better ways to counter the German U-boat campaign [Ref. 4] .
The science of Search Theory came out of that effort headed by
Bernard Koopman [Ref. 5] . Fifty years later, the application
of Search Theory to the problem of finding mobile TBM
launchers may provide valuable insights into the problem and
help lead to possible solutions.
D. STATEMENT OF THESIS
In this thesis, the science of Search Theory, particularly
the random search model, is applied to the problem of finding
mobile Tactical Ballistic Missile launchers.
E. THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter II of this thesis further defines the problem of
finding TBM launchers, describes the characteristics of the
launchers and the searchers, and explores the similarities and
differences between finding TBM launchers and U-boats for
which Search Theory was developed.
In Chapter III the methodology of the analysis is
discussed. This includes an introduction to the Random Search
model and a description of how it must be modified to be
relevant to searching for TBM launchers.
Chapter IV discusses the results of the modified search
model
.
Chapter V examines some of the tactical implications
associated with the results of the modified search model.
Finally, in Chapter VI the thesis is summarized and ideas
for follow-on research are presented.
II. PROBLEM SCOPE
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
As was seen in Chapter I, numerous approaches can be taken
to the problem of defeating the tactical ballistic missile
(TBM) threat. Additionally, it was seen by looking at the
Circulation Model for TBM launchers, that even a modest
improvement in the pre-launch search and destruction success
will greatly reduce the maximum expected number of missiles
launched and the number of missiles reaching the target area.
The effort to destroy the launchers and associated support
equipment is called attack operations or counter-force . While
some work has been done in the counter- force area, the major
emphasis has been in finding ways to shoot down the missiles.
The counter- force effort should include search, detection, and
destruction of TBM launchers, support equipment, and missile
launch infrastructure. Recent work at the Naval Postgraduate
School has concentrated on the search, detection, and
destruction of TBM launchers before missile launch. Lt Hair
in his March 1993 thesis [Ref. 6] looked at a search effort
distribution problem. Specifically, he divided a large search
area into smaller sub-areas and assigned to each sub-area a
probability based on the likelihood that a TBM missile
launcher was operating there. These probabilities were
assigned based primarily on the surface contours in the sub-
area and the proximity to roads. Lt Hair then developed an
optimum distribution of search effort based on these
probabilities. 1 A similar effort to identify likely operating
areas for TBM launchers was used during the Persian Gulf War
with good results. This thesis looks at the overall search
process through a mathematical model in an effort to identify
strategies that will improve search performance.
B. THE TARGET
Any effort to quantify search effectiveness must start
with the target characteristics. The primary target when
looking for TBM launchers is the MAZ-543 transporter-erector-
launcher (TEL) . It is the primary launch support vehicle for
SS-1B (Scud-A) , SS-1C (Scud-B) , and SS-12 (Scaleboard)
surface-to-surface missiles. It is also representative of
other surface-to-surface launch support vehicles, and will
likely be in service for many years to come. The MAZ-543 TEL
is 12 meters long, weighs 29,000 kg (with missile), and is
capable of 60 kph on hard surfaces with a range of 1500 km.
Typical operations of the TEL are shown in Figure 2. In
peacetime the launchers and missiles are located in
centralized storage areas. Then sometime during the
transition to hostilities the missiles and launchers are
lSee Washburn, A. R.
,
Search and Detection, Chapter 5,ORSA





Figure 2. Mobile TBM Launcher Operations,
deployed to Forward Staging and Replenishment sites. Once
hostilities commence the launchers operate from their Forward
Staging sites, completing a cycle every time a missile is
launched. First the TELs will transit to a Replenishment area
where a single fueled missile is loaded onto each, then they
transit to the launch area utilizing one or more hide sites
along the way. At the launch site the missiles are erected,
aligned, and fired. The TELs then strike down and transit
back to their Forward Staging area again utilizing one or more
hide sites to avoid detection and destruction. The key item
to notice in this scenario is that the launchers are not
continuously out in the open, able to be detected by enemy
sensors. An example of this model is given in the
unclassified Warbreaker2 scenario. In that scenario the
transits between the major nodes are several kilometers (about
10-15 minutes) , and the time to set-up and strike down from
missile launch is about 1 hour and 15 minutes, respectively.
That implies that the total time the TEL is out in the open,
exposed to surveillance assets, is about 2 hours. The
implication of this will be examined in more detail in
Chapters III and IV of this thesis.
C. SEARCHER CHARACTERISTICS
For the purpose of this thesis the searcher will be
assumed to be some type of airborne craft and all searchers
will have similar characteristics. The specific details of
the searcher like its speed, altitude, endurance, and sensor
suite will be captured in variables that will then be
normalized for analysis. As an example the searcher's
detection capability will be characterized by its Sweep Width,
2Warbreaker is a distributed man-in-the-loop simulation
developed for the Strategic Defense Initiative Office that has been
used to evaluate attack operations against TBM launchers.
10
W. 3 No effort has been made to compare differing platforms'
effectiveness. In general the searcher will have to transit
from its base of operations to the search area, search the
area with its sensors, investigate possible contacts, and
return to its base. One searcher can be relieved on station
by another searcher or multiple searchers can search
simultaneously to provide greater coverage. The specific
details of the searcher, other than it is airborne and that
its characteristics can be captured by variables, are not
important to this model
.
D. SIMILARITIES TO ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
Countering the TBM problem has been likened to Anti-
submarine Warfare [Ref . 2] . Several key considerations make
this comparison valid.
First, both submarines and TBM launchers have a high
degree of stealthiness . Both know that to stay alive and to
be effective they must use their stealthiness to great
advantage. The commanders will choose to give up their
stealthiness when it is advantageous to do so. Each must come
out into the open to deliver ordnance on target. 4 For the
3See Washburn, A. R. , Search and Detection, Chapter 4, ORSA
Books, 1989 or United States Naval Academy, Naval Operation
Analysis, 2nd ed., Chapter 6, Naval Institute Press, 1977 for more
information about sweep widths and lateral ranges curves.
4For the purposes of this discussion it is assumed the




opposing force this means that the opportunities for detection
will be limited and each opportunity must be capitalized upon.
Secondly, the TBM threat is so complex and the cost of
failure so high, that much analysis and effort should go into
defeating it. This is similar to the U-boat threat during
World War II, and the SSBN threat today. A great deal of
analytical thought has gone into fighting submarines from
diesel boats of WWII to modern nuclear powered subs of today.
Many of the models developed, and particularly the analytic
approach to the problem, can be applied to the TBM threat.
Ehlers' thesis [Ref. 2] is an excellent example of just such
an application. The development of much of Search and
Detection theory stems from the genesis of Operations Research
itself, finding and countering the U-boats of WWII.
Finally, the operations of WWII U-boats and TBM launchers
are very similar. Both are exposed for periods of time where
they are susceptible to detection (U-boats proceeding to
patrol, TBM launchers moving to the launch area) . Both can
evade detection by hiding (submerging for the U-boat) but at
a cost in time to reach a weapons delivery position. Then
once at the weapons delivery position (convoy for U-boat) they
both operate in the open for extended periods (surface attack
by WWII U-boats) followed by hiding (submerging) and returning
to base. Since the basic operations are so similar, the
models for search and detection of submarines can be applied
to TBM launchers.
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E. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TBM LAUNCHERS AND SUBMARINES
There are at least two major differences between TBM
launchers and submarines. First, for submarines to threaten
United States forces they have to operate fairly close to
those forces, generally in international waters. In
international waters there are no restrictions on search
operations. However, the TBM launcher with its long range
missiles can threaten U.S. forces from within the territorial
limits of its country. Since searching for TBM launchers
generally requires flying over the host country, search
operations conducted prior to war could violate international
law and the sovereignty of the nation. In times of war the
searcher is vulnerable to enemy actions. The searcher has to
have local air superiority in the search area to be most
effective. The use of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) or
unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs) would lesson the danger
from enemy action, however without local air superiority, the
unmanned vehicles could be shot down with the loss of a
valuable search asset. Additionally, if the use of remote
ground based sensors is planned, local air superiority is
needed to deploy the sensors. In Desert Storm air superiority
was gained quickly, but this may not always be the case.
Searching for the TBM launchers should not be discredited
because of the need for air superiority since early control of




Another major difference between searching for submarines
and searching for TBM launchers is the detection mechanisms.
Submarine detection models based on acoustic detection in open
ocean clearly do not apply to the TBM threat. 5 Similarly,
models that assume a continuous detection possibility cannot
be used directly because of the exposed/hiding nature of the
TBM launchers. This does not invalidate all Ant i- Submarine
Warfare detection models. The analyst however does need to
look at the underlying assumptions and determine whether they
are valid. Again it is the analytical process that
characterizes ASW analysis, not a particular model.
The final difference between submarines and TBM launchers
has to do with group operations. Submarines today generally
operate independently, and even the U-boats of WWII transited
independently. However, the components that make up the TBM
force may be highly coordinated. One likely consideration is
a salvo. A salvo is the simultaneous launch of many missiles
at the same target to try and overwhelm the active defenses.
Additionally, since a country is likely to have only tens to
hundreds of missiles, centralized control could be common.
With centralized control one would expect to see some sort of
coordination between the various TBM forces, including either
a propensity to shoot missiles at certain times of day or a
coordinated deception plan with dummy missiles and launchers.
5This assumes no breakthroughs in detection of TBM launchers
utilizing seismic sensors.
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Even though submarines and TBM launchers have many things
in common they also have some major differences. These
differences do not invalidate the comparison of TBM forces to
submarine forces, as long as the goal of applying the




One aspect of Ant i- Submarine Warfare that has received
much attention is the development of detection models. These
models have been used to identify efficient search strategies,
to identify which components provide the greatest marginal
improvement in performance, and to determine how long to
search to achieve specific goals. Similar types of
information are required to successfully counter the theater
ballistic missile in future conflicts. The models developed
to describe searches for submarines can be used, with some
modification, to describe searches for theater ballistic
missile launchers and support equipment.
One of the most common search models is the random search.
In this search model one searcher is trying to find a single
target, the target is continuously exposed to detection, and
the target is assumed to be stationary. If the searcher has
a significant speed advantage over the target (such as
airplanes searching for surfaced submarines) the target need
not be absolutely stationary for the stationary target
assumption to still be valid. However, in the TBM problem the
target is definitely not continuously exposed to detection, so
any ASW search model has to be modified before it can be
16
applied to the TBM problem. In practice the random search
model closely describes real world search efforts and so the
study of the random search model is emphasized. The details
of the random search model are presented in section B to lay
the ground work for further development
.
B. RANDOM SEARCH MODEL
The random search model assumes that the target is
randomly distributed in an area A, that the search for the
target is conducted in a random manner, that the target is
continuously exposed to detection, and that the target is
stationary. These assumptions mean that the random search is
a lower bound on search effectiveness 6 since a search that is
conducted systematically has little or no duplication of
effort and is more effective.
The randomness of the search should not be considered an
unrealistic approach since even a carefully planned exhaustive
search may turn out to be more random than exhaustive in
practice. Many things can affect a carefully planned search
including navigation errors, gaps in coverage, refueling,
investigation of possible contacts, poor turnover between
searchers, and other real world events. Likewise the
stationary target assumption is not a serious restriction if
the searcher has a significant speed advantage over the
6This assumes one does not deliberately try to conduct a more
inefficient search by not moving or by not looking.
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target. This is because the target cannot move very far
during the course of the search. However, target motion does
make the search more random in nature. Finally, the
continuous exposure assumption does not hold for TBM launcher
searches since they may remain hidden for significant periods
of time. The random search model has to be modified to
account for this fact.
Appendix A gives the derivation of the mathematical
formulation for the random search model. The basic
formulation is
^det seazc,} = l - e-v*
= 1 - e"z
where
P{det search } is the probability of detecting the target
during a search of total length L,
W is the sweep width, a term that accounts for the
effectiveness of the searcher's sensor in the given
environment against the given target,
L is the length of the random search in area A, and is
equivalent to the searchers velocity V times the total time T
searched,
A is the area being searched that contains the target,
z (= WL/A) is called the coverage ratio [Ref . 8:p. 2-5]
.
It is a measure of how many times the search area A is covered
in a search of total length L or time T, since L=VT.
18
Figure 3 shows how the probability of detecting a
continuously exposed target varies with the coverage ratio.
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Figure 3. Random Search Model Results.
the target will be detected at least once. Depending on the
particular values of the sweep width W, the area A, and the
searcher speed V; the time required to search to achieve any
particular P{det} can be found (choose P{det}, use figure to
get z, then T=zA/WV)
.
The random search model does not accurately represent the
search for TBM launchers since they can be hidden from current
19
sensors much of the time. To account for this, the random
search model must be modified.
C. MODIFIED RANDOM SEARCH FORMULATION
Consider the case where the target is not continuously
exposed to detection. In the derivation of the basic random
search model given in Appendix A the first small segment of
the search is analyzed. In this segment the development says
two things must happen for a detection to occur. The target
must be within the searcher's maximum sensor range and the
target must be detected. However, in the basic model the
target cannot hide; if the searcher gets close enough,
detection is guaranteed. This is not necessarily the case for
mobile ballistic missile launchers. It is possible the
launcher could be stored in a warehouse or hiding under a
bridge and not be detectable by search sensors being used.
Forrest [Ref. 7:pp. 33-35] accounts for the intermittent
detectability of a target by reducing the sweep width.
However, most of the factors that affect the target's exposure
probability are not controllable by the searcher so we chose
to consider the target's actions as a separate term. The
classic model was modified to include a third factor for
detection to occur; the target must be exposed.
Call the event that the target is physically within the
searcher's maximum sensor range B, the event that the target
is exposed C, and the event that the target is actually
20
detected D. Then the conditional probability for detection of
the target in the small segment of search is
^det segment} = PiD\B, d PiC\B\ M
= _^ p{C\B}
Setting P{C|b}=0 and extending the development of the basic
random search model in Appendix A over the entire search, the
modified formulation becomes
^det search} = 1 - e-«**
Finally, letting z = WL/A the modified random search model
becomes
^det searJ = 1 - e~*.
The key factor in this modified random search model is 0.
It is the probability that the target will be exposed when the
searcher is within effective detection range W of the target.
If the target does not know the searcher is present or if the
target does not change his operations even if he knows when
the searcher is present, then can be estimated by the
proportion of the search time that the target is exposed. For
example if the target is exposed on the average two hours per
day and the search area is searched continuously 24 hours per
day, then 0=2/24=0.083.
If the target always knows when the searcher is present
and hides, then the probability of detection is zero. But the
enemy will never shoot any missiles if the searcher can search
21
continuously 24 hours per day since the launcher must be
exposed to detection to launch.
Search effectiveness by the searcher can be improved if he
only searches when the launchers are exposed to detection. By
only searching when the launchers are exposed, approaches
one (the random search model) . The searcher requires
excellent intelligence information to approach this ideal.
The type of intelligence information required might be
provided by remote ground-based sensors, human spotters, or
through analysis of historical operations. In general can
be either deterministic or random and the behavior of this
model with respect to will be explored in the next Chapter.
D. EXTENSION TO SIMULTANEOUS MULTIPLE SEARCHERS
Now consider the case where M identical searchers are
simultaneously looking for a TBM launcher. Let the ith
searcher have a sweep width of W and total search length L.
Then the probability of detecting the TBM launcher in that
first segment of search effort for the ith searcher is the
same as the one searcher one target case. However, now the
search is simultaneously repeated M times over the total
search area A. Therefore the probability of any searcher
detecting the target during the search of the first segment is
M times the one searcher one target case
Pidet } = *™^c ^^
^ segments' »t*
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Extending the development as in Appendix A over the entire
search of length L, the probability of any searcher detecting
the TBM launcher during the length of the search becomes
Pldet search} = 1 - e****
If all M searchers are not identical, and the ith searcher
has a sweep width Wi; then the probability of any searcher
detecting the target in the first simultaneous segment of
search is
pfdet J = i^V W.^^G[
- segments' NA^ 2
Over the entire search effort this becomes
^det search} = 1 - e «
where there are M total searchers, the ith searcher has a
sweep width of Vlil and each searches simultaneously over a
total length L.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF MODIFIED RANDOM SEARCH MODEL
In Chapter III the random search model and a modified
formulation of the random search model were discussed. The
modified random search model incorporated the probability that
the target may not be continuously exposed to detection. In
this chapter we will look more closely at the probability that
the target is exposed to detection and the effects on the
overall probability of detecting the target with a given
search effort.
A. DETERMINISTIC EXPOSURE
The first case to consider when investigating the
probability that the. target is exposed, is the deterministic
case, when is a constant. In the deterministic problem the
probability that a target is exposed to detection when the
searcher is within sensor range is fixed (for example, it may
be 20 percent so that = 0.2) . First it must be assumed that
the target does not alter his operating patterns due to the
search effort. This means either that the target does not
know when the searcher is near, or that the target does not
care. Secondly it must be assumed that the target operating
characteristics do not vary directly with the time of day and
that target operations are uniformly distributed around the
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clock. With these assumptions the probability of target
exposure for any searcher is equal to the overall proportion
of time that the target is exposed. If the target, on the
average, spends 12 out of every 24 hours exposed then the
probability that the target will be exposed for a random
searcher is 0.5 (50 percent)
.
Figure 4 shows how the probability of detection for a
random search varies with the coverage ratio (z) and the
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Figure 4. Modified Random Search Model Results
Figure 5 uses the same data to show the coverage ratio
required to achieve various probabilities of detection versus
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Figure 5 . Required Level of Search Effort
.
As the proportion of time that the target is exposed falls
below about 0.3 or 30 percent the required coverage ratio
increases dramatically. For an 80 percent probability of
detection one has to cover the search area 16 times in a given
search if the target is exposed 10 percent of the time. To
achieve the same probability of detection for the same amount
of search effort, the search area only has to be covered about
3.5 times if the target is exposed 50 percent of the time. If
the target was continuously exposed to detection, as in the
classic case, a coverage ratio of less than two is required.
The amount of search effort required to achieve a constant
probability of detection is very dependent on the probability
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that the target will be exposed when within sensor range of
the searcher. Next we will consider the exposure probability
to be a random variable and analyze the results.
B. UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED EXPOSURE
The required search effort for a desired probability of
detection as measured by the coverage ratio is extremely
dependent on the proportion of time the target is exposed to
detection. In the last section it was assumed that the target
exposure proportion was deterministic. However, in real world
situations, without good intelligence information one is
unlikely to know very much about the target operations. This
will most likely be true in the first several days of a
conflict when no operational data has yet been obtained.
Additionally, for any particular search mission, the target
may be exposed a random fraction of the search time even if
overall the exposure proportion is constant. For these
reasons we analyzed the level of effort required when the
probability that the target is exposed to a searcher is itself
a random variable.
The first random variable used to characterize target
exposure was the uniform random variable. The probability of
target exposure is assumed to vary between zero and one with
equal likelihood and the expected value is one-half. The
uniform random variable is used when one knows little or
nothing about the true probability of the target being exposed
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to detection. Again this is probably a good assumption when
looking at a single search mission provided the target does
not change his operating characteristics due to the search
effort. Since the probability of the target being exposed in
the small element of search is now a random variable, the
overall probability of detection for the search also becomes
a random variable. By assuming a uniform probability
distribution for the target exposure, an unconditional
probability of detection can be determined that is a function
of the coverage ratio. Appendix B gives the details of
computing the unconditional probability of detection for the
search when the target exposure
<t> is uniformly distributed
between zero and one. The result is that
^det searJ = 1 - 1 + ±1
Figure 6 shows how the unconditional probability of
detection varies with the coverage ratio. For an 80 percent
probability of detection overall, a coverage ratio of about
five is required. This corresponds roughly to a deterministic
value of 4> of about 0.4.
C. TRIANGULARLY DISTRIBUTED TARGET EXPOSURES
1. Triangular Distribution with Mean of One-half
In this section the probability that the target is
exposed when the searcher is within maximum sensor range is
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Figure 6. <i> Distributed Uniform (0,1) .
triangular distribution with a mean and a mode of 0.5 is
assumed. The probability density function for this triangular
distribution is shown in Figure 7. This type of distribution
corresponds to the case where some reaction to the search
effort is expected from the target. Sometimes, the target
knows when the searcher is overhead, so it is only exposed on
the average half of the time. But now the variability around
that average value is less than the uniform case. It is
unlikely that the target will be continuously exposed or that
the target will never be exposed at all. The probability of
detection for the search is a random variable conditioned on
the value of and Appendix B has the details of the
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Figure 7 . Density of Triangle Distribution
derivation of the unconditional probability of detection
P(det search 2 — A a z — c?2 _(8e - 4e 4)
Figure 8 shows how the unconditional probability of
detection for the search varies with the coverage ratio when
<£ is distributed triangularly. Note that now for an 80
percent unconditional probability of detection that a coverage
ratio of less than four is required. The results are more
favorable to the searcher when <i> is distributed triangularly
than when <£ is distributed uniformly, even though they both
have the same expected value of one-half. This is because the
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Figure 8. * Distributed Triangularly with Mean One-half.
2. Triangular Distribution with Mean of One-Third
Next consider another triangle distribution. This
time consider the distribution shown in Figure 9. The
distribution has a mean of one- third and a mode of zero. This
distribution is indicative of a target that has a good idea of
when the searcher is near so it is hidden most of the time.
Another interpretation is that the target is only exposed a
small fraction of the search time because the nature of the
operations only require relatively short exposures. The
actual probability that the target is exposed varies, but it
is heavily weighted toward no exposure with no chance of being
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Figure 9. Density of Triangle Distribution Mean One-Third.
derivation of the unconditional probability of detection. The
formula for the unconditional probability of detection as a
function of the coverage ratio is
ddetgeax(J = -L (z 2 - 2e~ z - 2z + 2)
z A
The unconditional probability of detection is plotted
versus the coverage ratio in Figure 10. For an 80 percent
probability of detection a coverage ratio of about nine is
required. This compares to a coverage ratio of about four
when <f> is distributed triangularly with mean one-half and a











0.01 10 15 20
Coverage Ratio z
30
Figure 10. <£ Distributed Triangularly with Mean One-Third.
D . SUMMARY
In this chapter we looked at how the probability of
detecting an intermittently exposed target during a search
varies with the coverage ratio of the search. We examined
several cases, both deterministic and stochastic, for the
probability that the target is exposed when the searcher is
within sensor range. Specifically, the probability of the
target being exposed was considered to be deterministic,
Uniform (0,1), Triangular (0,1) with mean one-half, and
Triangular (0,1) with mean one-third. Table 1 summarizes the
results. It can be seen that the amount of search effort, as
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measured by the coverage ratio, varies significantly depending
on whether the target is continuously exposed to detection, is
only exposed to detection a fraction of the time, or is
exposed a random fraction of the time.
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The coverage ratio required for a given probability of
detection is a function of the average exposure proportion as
well as the variance of that exposure. First, three cases
with mean exposures of one, one-half, and one-third are shown.
The lower the mean exposure the higher the required coverage
ratio for any desired probability of detection. The increase
in required search effort is not linear and as was shown in
34
Figure 5, the required coverage ratio increases dramatically
for mean exposures below about one -third. Next, compare the
three cases where the expected target exposure is one-half to
see the effect of the variance of $ on the results. The
deterministic case has no variance and has the lowest required
coverage ratio for any desired probability of detection. For
the probablistic distributions the required coverage ratio
increases with increasing variance for all probabilities of
detection. The required search effort to achieve a certain
probability of detection increases with lowering expected
exposure and increases with increasing variance. The next
chapter will explore how to achieve these required coverage
ratios including the implications to TBM counter- force
campaign planning.
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V. TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SEARCH MODEL
In the last chapter the results of the random search model
and the modified model were presented. In this chapter we
will interpret the results in terms of the physical world and
attempt to show the implications of the model on campaign
planning and future research and development efforts.
The modified random search model states that the
probability of detecting a target during a search is an
exponential function that depends on the sweep width of the
searcher W, the probability that the target is exposed when
within sensor range of the searcher 0, the size of the area
being searched A, and the total length searched L.
^det search |S> = 4>} = 1 - e A
Further, in the last chapter we showed how the probability of
detection depends on the mean and variance of the probability
of the target being exposed 0.
The purpose of the attack operations against the TBM
launchers and support equipment is to reduce or eliminate
ballistic missile launches. This reduces the number of
missiles that have to be countered by active defenses, thus
making them more effective. Additionally, the attack
operations can reduce the possibility of large salvos of
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missiles that could saturate the active defenses. Therefore,
attack operations can be effective even without destroying
ballistic missile launchers, if the operations result in fewer
and less frequent missile launches. This chapter will discuss
ways that attack operations can be improved by considering
factors that enter into the search model and considering some
factors that are outside of the model
.
A. FACTORS AFFECTING THE COVERAGE RATIO
The coverage ratio z = WL/A is a measure of the level of
search effort required to achieve a certain probability of
detection. The coverage ratio is the fraction of the total
area covered by the searcher during a search effort that
covers a total distance L and width W. Since in a random
search the formula is exponential some locations are covered
more than once during the search. We saw in the last section
that to get a specific probability of detection a certain
minimum coverage ratio was needed. Ways to achieve greater
coverage ratios will be examined by looking at the factors
that contribute to the coverage ratio.
1 . Sweep Width
The sweep width is a measure of the effectiveness of
the searcher to find the target in a given environment. The
sweep width is a function of many things including the type of
sensor used, the speed and altitude of the searcher, the
alertness of the sensor operator, the environment, the time of
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day, the terrain, etc. In general, the larger the sweep width
the larger the coverage ratio for any length of search effort.
However the sweep width as used here refers to an effective
sweep width, that is, the range such that a target can be
identified as a TBM launcher. Because of terrain and
environmental considerations, just increasing the range of a
radar may not increase the sweep width, unless the increased
range includes increased identification ability. Most of the
factors that affect the sweep width are outside of the control
of the searcher, but a few are not. First, the searcher
should use the most effective sensors possible. This also
means the planner should consider which platforms to assign to
particular missions. For example a night mission should be
flown by aircraft with infrared or low-light-level sensors as
well as radar. The next factor is searcher speed and
altitude. Generally for current sensors the lower and the
slower an aircraft flies the better the effective sweep width
of all sensors but the greater the danger from enemy action.
Items for future development that can improve the sweep width
include better sensors, manned aircraft that are less
susceptible to enemy fire (stealthy or good defenses) , and
remotely or autonomously piloted vehicles.
2 . Total Search Length
The total search length L is a direct measure of the
amount of time spent searching since time equals the total
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length divided by the searcher's speed. The longer one
searches the higher the probability of detecting the target.
Therefore one way to increase the coverage ratio is to search
longer, where continuous coverage 24 hours a day is the most
one can do. If the search assets are available to provide
continuous coverage for the length of the campaign, then any
further improvements in search effort must be made by
increasing the sweep width or speed of the searcher. For
example if the searcher flies at 400 nm/hr and the sweep width
is 1 nm, then continuous coverage yields 9,600 sq nm covered
per day. If the search area is 10,000 sq nm then the coverage
ratio is about one per day and to get a required coverage
ratio of ten would require 10 days of search. With most
sensors there is an optimum speed. Searching too fast reduces
the sweep width and searching too slow doesn't cover enough
ground. So another way to increase the coverage ratio is to
search longer or to change the search speed closer to the
optimum value.
3 . Search Area
The last parameter in the random search equation that
the operator can affect is the size of the search area. By
using programs like Lt . Hair's [Ref . 6] that identify areas in
which the TBM launchers are likely to operate the size of the
search area can be reduced. The factors that influence these
programs can include terrain data, likely ballistic missile
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aim points, ballistic missile range, command and control
nodes, and transportation networks. If the search area is
reduced too much though it may no longer contain the target
and no amount of search effort will find it. Therefore the
search area must be sufficiently large to reasonably contain
the target but should not be excessive. If the target can
hide then the use of negative search information to reduce the
search area has limited value. One has to be careful to say
the target is not in an area because it wasn't detected, since
it is possible the target was not exposed to detection during
the search.
B. FACTORS AFFECTING TARGET EXPOSURE TO DETECTION
Chapter IV showed that the level of search effort to
achieve a set probability of detection is highly dependent on
the probability that the target is exposed to detection when
the target is within the searcher's sensor range. The
probability of target exposure is mostly a function of the
target's actions and priorities, but there are a few things
the searcher can do. The more the target is exposed the
better the chance the searcher can finding him. The following
sections discuss tactical factors that can affect the
likelihood of the target being exposed to detection.
1. Use of Passive Sensors
The first tactic the searcher can use to keep the
target exposed is to use passive sensors such as visual and
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infrared. If the target does not know when the searcher is
near he cannot avoid detection by hiding. However, the
reduced sweep width of those sensors may be a factor. The
U.S. Navy used active sensors to try to find submarines for
years with little success because the submarines could detect
the searchers long before they could hope to detect the
submarine. The submarines would just avoid the searcher by
staying hidden, the same is true for the TBM launcher forces.
A very important example of this tradeoff between
target exposure and effective sweep width follows. If by
staying passive the probability of the target being exposed
goes from 0.2 to 0.4, Figure 5 shows that for an 80 percent
probability of detection, the coverage ratio goes from about
eight to about four . This is a 50 percent reduction in the
required search effort and probably would offset the reduced
sweep width of passive sensors.
2. Use of Active Sensors
The use of active sensors can also be beneficial.
Since the measure of effectiveness of attack operations is
reducing the number of missiles launched, flooding an area
with active emissions can cause the TBM force to remain
hidden. The probability of detecting the launchers will be
low but the operation will be a success because no missiles
will be launched. It must be assumed that any country that
can develop a ballistic missile capability can also develop
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the capability to detect radar emissions (electronic
surveillance measures, ESM) . However, for the active sensors
to be a deterrent to operations, the threat must be credible;
that is the active sensors must be able to detect the
launchers. At some point the need to conduct their mission
will force the TBM forces to expose themselves. If the
launchers are not detected and prosecuted, the TBM force will
realize the threat is not credible and active sensors will no
longer be a deterrent. Active sensors can reduce the number
of missile launches and prevent salvos of missiles from being
launched if the TBM forces can detect the active sensors and
if the use of active sensors represents a credible threat to
TBM forces.
3 . Use of Area Denial Weapons
A second tactic that can be used to increase the
target's exposure is to use area denial weapons like land
mines in likely operating areas. Even if the target does not
hit a land mine, it will probably have to slow down to make
sure it avoids the mines. By reducing the target's effective
speed, its' exposure time is increased.
4. Destruction of Roads and Bridges
Another tactic would be to randomly bomb roads and
bridges. It is unlikely that the launchers will be hit, but
they will be forced to go around damaged areas. When
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avoiding damage to improved roads the launchers will have to
go slower and will be more exposed to detection.
C. MULTIPLE SEARCHERS
Another method to achieve the required probability of
detecting the target is to use multiple searchers. As was
shown in the last chapter, multiple searchers add to the
amount of area being swept per unit time. Two identical
searchers operating simultaneously will sweep out more search
area than one searcher. However, adding more searchers to
reduce the expected time till detection may not be valid due
to the random nature of the probability of target exposure.
For example, if a coverage ratio of ten is needed for 80
percent probability of detection and one searcher sweeps out
one coverage ratio per hour, then ten identical searchers
should achieve the 8 percent value in one hour. However, the
probability of target exposure values are long run averages
and will probably not hold over the relatively short period of
one hour. But ten searchers operating over many hours should
perform like the model predicts, discounting non-random
events
.
D. FACTORS OUTSIDE OF THE SEARCH MODEL
The final factors to be consider are the ones that are not
explicitly stated in the search model. Factors like training,
tactics, and the use of operational analysis are not part of
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this model, but can offer significant improvements in search
performance
.
1. Historical Analysis of Operations
Another way to improve search performance is through
historical analysis of target operations. This is an area
that the Anti- Submarine Warfare people have long stressed. By
looking at the operations of the target over several days or
weeks, patterns will emerge that can be exploited. For
example over 80 percent of the TBM launches during the Persian
Gulf war were at night [Ref . 3] . Patterns like this allow the
searcher to tune the search effort. By searching when the
launchers are historically active, the probability that a
target will be exposed to detection during the search
increases and so does the probability of detecting the target.
2 . Cuing the Search Effort
A second factor to be considered is cued search. If
the searcher could know when the target is exposed to
detection, the searcher wouldn't waste search effort when the
target was hiding. Tuning the search effort to when it is
most beneficial effectively increases the probability of the
target being exposed during the search and increases the
probability of detection. One way to know when the target is
exposed is to use remote ground based sensors that can detect
when a launcher is moving. Such sensors were used during the
Vietnam War to indicate troop and resupply movements.
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Additionally, human intelligence such as observers in place
behind enemy lines could perform the same mission but with a
much higher risk. Having observers on the ground, either
human or electronic can provide the searcher with detailed
information about when and where targets are exposed to
detection. Using such information can significantly increase
the chances of detecting the target.
3. Training and Practice
Having a warfare community that is trained in search
theory and routinely practices searching for TBM launchers can
greatly improve search effectiveness. Another good quality of
the Navy Ant i- Submarine Warfare community is the emphasis on
training and practice. Searching for TBM launchers requires
specialized training in search theory, target recognition, and
search tactics. These items must be included into the
training of all attack aircraft crews. Additionally, the
attack operations mission has to be specifically assigned to
a few squadrons which can emphasize this type of training.
Along with practice and training goes the evaluation of
effective tactics and the evaluation of new sensors and
weapons. As an additional benefit these squadrons will become
repositories of knowledge about how best to counter the TBM
launchers. To improve performance in the attack operations
mission, attack squadrons must train to counter TBM launchers.
Additionally, a few squadrons should specialize in these
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counter- force operations to develop and evaluate new tactics,
to evaluate new sensors and weapons, and to maintain a
knowledge base about countering the TBM threat
.
4. Destroy or Trail
One final way to effectively improve search
performance is to follow a TBM launcher once it is detected.
By following a launcher it may be possible to identify
launcher or missile storage areas or to further refine the
operating areas and patterns. However if the launcher is
subsequently lost nothing will have been gained. Indeed
Decision Theory suggests that if the expected benefit from
following the launcher in terms of additional launchers killed
is less than one, then the launcher should not be followed and
it should be attacked. Launchers can also be marked for
easier trailing. Methods of marking a launcher can include
florescent paints, or paints with radioactive elements that
can be applied from the air. Ideally, if the goal is to
follow the launcher then the paints could be applied across a
roadway ahead of the launcher which would then be picked up on
the wheels or tracks of the launcher. This way the launcher
would be identified for easier tracking without the launcher
crew knowing and reacting. Other methods of identifying and
marking TBM launchers can be developed and evaluated.
However for any of these methods to be worthwhile the
probability of losing the launcher must be fairly low,
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otherwise the searcher would be better off, in terms of
numbers of launchers destroyed, attacking and destroying all
launchers that are detected.
E . SUMMARY
In this chapter the various factors that affect search
performance were discussed. Those factors were divided into
four major categories. First the explicit model parameters
were discussed indicating the types of actions that could
improve search performance. The explicit model parameters
discussed included terms in the coverage ratio and the
probability of target exposure. Next the use of several
searchers working simultaneously was discussed as a way to
cover more of the search area in a limited amount of time.
Finally, factors not explicitly detailed in the model were
discussed. The performance of search assets in the Persian
Gulf War was poor but by analyzing search models like this one
systematic improvements in performance are possible.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
In this thesis we have seen that search models originally
developed to locate WWII U-boats can be applied, if
appropriately modified, to the analysis of modern tactical
ballistic missile searches. The appropriate modification to
the random search model was to include an additional parameter
that accounts for the fact that TBM launchers can be hidden
from view when the searcher is within sensor range. This type
of modified model can also be used for modern diesel submarine
warfare in shallow water where acoustic detection is unlikely
and the diesel submarine can hide by submerging or lowering
its periscope. A model developed for use against diesel
submarines (really surface ships that could submerge) has been
updated and fifty years later can be used against diesel
submarines and TBM launchers
.
When analyzing the results of the modified search model it
became apparent that a target that can hide can significantly
increase the search effort required to achieve the same
probability of detection. A target that is continuously
exposed requires a coverage ratio of about two for an 80
percent probability of detection, while the same target if
only exposed a constant 20 percent of the time requires a
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four- fold increase in the coverage ratio to about eight to
achieve the same 80 percent probability of detection. We also
considered the possibility that the probability of target
exposure could be a random variable. For the three
distributions considered for the random variable, the required
search effort increased with decreasing mean exposure and
increased with increasing variance. Depending on the desired
probability of detection, the required search effort increased
by a factor of eight or more.
As the results of Desert Storm showed, finding mobile TBM
launchers is a difficult problem. This modified random search
model illustrates the additional search effort required to
find a non-cooperative target. The model also highlights how
the entire search effort is strongly affected by the tactics
used by the mobile TBM launcher crews. To improve the
performance of the United States military against mobile TBM
launchers requires a combination of training with existing
systems and the procurement of very capable systems in the
future. Models like this allow the analyst to properly
evaluate the conflicting requirements.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The most efficient way to reduce the number of ballistic
missiles reaching a target area is to destroy the fixed and
mobile TBM launchers and support equipment. By removing an
enemy's means of launching and supporting ballistic missiles,
49
we greatly reduce the threat to friendly forces.
Additionally, a campaign of attacking TBM launchers increases
the effectiveness of active defensive systems because they are
less likely to be overwhelmed by large salvos of missiles.
To be successful at attacking mobile ballistic missile
launchers prior to launch, improvements must be made in
several key areas. This model suggests several ways to
improve pre-launch tactical ballistic missile launcher
detection. Those improvements include:
• developing better sensors, preferably passive, which allow
for the detection of TBM launchers at greater ranges
• increasing the time-on-station capabilities of search
assets
• reducing the area to be searched by using computer aided
search models to identify likely operating areas
• using area denial weapons like mines to increase the
amount of time the launchers are exposed to detection
• destroying roads and overpasses in TBM launcher operating
areas to increase the exposure time
• developing and using remote ground based sensors or human
observers to better refine when and where to search
• increasing the number of searchers, which increases the
level of effort
• using analysis of historical operations to refine when and
where to search
• marking or trailing launchers once they are found if the
expected benefit of finding a staging area is greater than
the benefit of killing that launcher
• developing search tactics that make the search effort less
random and more systematic
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These suggestions can greatly improve the performance of
friendly forces in reducing the threat from Tactical Ballistic
Missiles
.
C. POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH
With the increased proliferation of tactical ballistic
missiles, the application of search theory to locate TBM
launchers will become increasingly important. Additionally,
as the Defense Department downsizes, there will be increased
emphasis on simulations to evaluate new tactics. The modified
random search model presented in this thesis is relatively
simplistic. It only models the search performance of
simultaneous, identical searchers against a single target. A
more general formulation that allows for a time varying number
of searchers and targets, each with different characteristics
is possible for computer implementation.
Let m(t) be the number of searchers at time t, and let
n(t) be the number of targets at time t. Then the detection
rate at time t is given by
v m V W m(t)n(t)
where V is the searcher velocity and W is the searcher sweep
width and A is the search area. The probability of detecting
any target by time t is
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-jy(T) dt
Pdet (t) = 1 - e
•
In a computer implementation, the entire detection rate can be
replaced by an m by n matrix where each element represents the
detection rate of searcher i against target j . This allows
for each searcher to have a different detection rate for each
target. The total detection rate can be computed by
multiplying the detection rate matrix on the left by the
vector of searchers and on the right by the vector of targets.
Such a computer implementation of the random search model
would be more robust than the mathematical model presented in
this thesis. Follow-on research could identify specific
scenarios like a large first strike or a salvo of five missile
launches. From these likely scenarios one could postulate
the number of searchers and the number of targets in the
search area as a function of time and then compute a
probability of detection for each scenario. In this way the
effects of various courses of action could be evaluated.
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APPENDIX A. DEVELOPMENT OF RANDOM SEARCH MODEL
This appendix contains the detailed derivation of the
probability of detecting a target utilizing the random search
model discussed in Chapter III. This derivation is based on
the development in Naval Operations Analysis [Ref . 9: pp. 125-
127]. Washburn [Ref. 8:pp. Chapter 2 1-4] derives the same
formula using differential equations.
A. RANDOM SEARCH MODEL
Assume that a target is randomly distributed in an area A,
and that the search is conducted in a random manner. What is
the probability that the target will be detected before the
searcher has searched for T time periods or covered a total
distance L?
If the searcher travels at a velocity of V, he will cover
a total distance L (= VT) by time T. Now divide the total
search length L into N segments of equal length L/N. For
detection to occur in the first segment, the target must be
within the maximum sensor range R,,, of the searcher, and the
target must be detected. The probability that a target will
be detected given that it is a certain range from the sensor
is given by the sensor's lateral range curve. The lateral
range curve can be replaced by a single quantity called the
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sweep width, W. The sweep width "represents the effective
width of the sensor's detection zone"[Ref. 9:p. 119] against
the given target in the given environmental conditions.
Therefore for a target to be detected it must be within an
area of length L/N and width W. The probability of detecting
the target in this area is found by dividing by the area by
the total search area A.
Pidetection) = —
NA
The probability of not detecting the target in the first
segment is 1 - Pjdetection} or
Pino detection) = 1 - —
NA
Now consider the entire search effort. The probability of not
detecting the target over the entire search is the probability
that the target is missed on all segments
N
Pino detectionseaich) = JJ (1 - -2£)
WL
NA
= (1 - WL )N
NA
Thus the probability of detecting the target over the entire
search is
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P\detectionseaich) = 1 - Pino detection seaich)
= i - (i - 2£)*
AH
This can be simplified by noting that for large N
tt \ W „ ^-o1 " - )
Letting a = WL/A
Pidetection seaich ) = 1 --(1 - i
= 1 - e" tt
Then the probability of detecting a target in an area A during
a search of total length L using a sensor with sweep width W
is
Pidetection search) = 1 - e~ WL/A .
Similarly, the probability of detection in terms of the total
search time T and searcher velocity V is
Pidetectionsearct) = 1 - e'^™ .
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APPENDIX B. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION BY CONDITIONING
From Chapter III the conditional probability of detecting
an intermittently exposed target during a random search is
given by
^det seareA |* = (J)} = 1 - e"*
where z = WVT/A and W is the sweep width, V is the velocity of
the searcher, T is the total time searching, and A is the
search area. <i> is the probability that the target will be
exposed to detection when the searcher is within his maximum
sensor range of the target. $ is a random variable, so the
unconditional P{det search } can be computed to conditioning on 4>
taking on specific values. To do this though, <f> must be
assumed to have a specific probability distribution function,
f$ (0) . We have assumed three possible distributions for *,
uniform (0,1), triangular (0,1) with mean one-half, and
triangular (0,1) with mean one-third.
A. $ DISTRIBUTED UNIFORMLY BETWEEN ZERO AND ONE
The unconditional probability is computed from the
conditional probability and the distribution of $ [Ref . 10]
.
Let E be an arbitrary event like detecting a target and let Y
be a continuous random variable with density f Y (y) . Then
56
P(E) = fp(E\Y = y)fy (y)dy
or
Pidet search ) = fp(detection^ = <$>) f<pQ>)cl<\>
— oo
For the Uniform (0,1) distribution
f# ffr) = i o < 4> < i
otherwise
Therefore the unconditional probability of detection can be
computed as
i
Pidet search) =/(l " e-*)d*
= 1-1
z z
B. * DISTRIBUTED TRIANGULARLY WITH MEAN ONE -HALF
Now assume 3> has a triangular distribution between zero
and one, and a mean of one-half. Figure 11 shows the
probability density function of the triangular distribution.
The density function is
f9 fy) = 4<}> o<4><-|
4 - 4(f) — <4><1
otherwise
Therefore the unconditional probability of detection is
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Figure 11. pdf of Triangular Distribution Mean One-Half
^detsearJ |(1 - e- z*)(44>)d(J) +
o
i
f (1 - e- z*)(4 - 4<j>) cftj)
= — (z 2 + 8e 2 - 4 - 4e" z )
C. # DISTRIBUTED TRIANGULARLY WITH MEAN ONE-THIRD
Finally, assume that $ is again distributed triangularly
between zero and one but this time the mean is one- third.
Figure 12 shows the probability density function of the
distribution. Mathematically, the density function is
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Figure 12. pdf of Triangle Distribution Mean One-third.
f9 Q) = 2 - 2(j> < (J) < 1
otherwise
The unconditional probability of detection when $ has a
triangular distribution with a mean of one-third is
*faetsearcJ = |(1 - e-*)<2 - 2(J))d(J)
1 /„2(z 2 - 2e" 2 - 2z + 2)
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